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With increasing commercial space activities occurring in the National Airspace System (NAS), the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has identified a need for more efficient management of
the NAS with respect to commercial space operations. Current methods for integration of aviation
and space activities employ a segregation approach, in which hazard areas are constructed around
launch and reentry operations and sections of airspace are closed to other users. Mission
objectives and vehicle characteristics dictate the extent of the closure in terms of location,
duration, and volume of airspace affected. Launches, reentries, and other operations have an
effect on other NAS stakeholders, causing delays, changes to airlines’ flight plans, and incurred
expenses from additional fuel burn caused by reroutes. Likewise, attempts to minimize these
effects can be detrimental to launch and reentry operators, leading to additional costs in delays and
lost opportunities for mission success. There is opportunity to improve efficiency and increase
NAS capacity. Hazard areas and airspace closures can be managed to reduce the effects on other
NAS users, and in turn, provide more launch opportunities. In addition to managing the NAS
more efficiently, potential for human error can be reduced by replacing manual processes with an
automated approach. The paper will discuss the development and testing of the FAA’s Space
Data Integrator (SDI) system as it aims to improve current NAS integration by automating
situational awareness, providing better monitoring of vehicles traveling through the NAS, and
enhancing the ability to detect and respond to off-nominal scenarios.

Introduction
The successful launch of the SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket in June of 2010 signaled a paradigm shift
from government-sponsored space operations to commercial space operations. With the
retirement of the Space Shuttle, the Falcon 9 and vehicles like it have broadened the commercial
space transportation industry to include commercial launch services performed for NASA and
other customers. Other recent activities across the commercial space transportation industry
indicate that additional growth in commercial space is underway. These include the successes of
SpaceX and Orbital/ATK in providing commercial cargo service to the International Space
Station and the sizeable resource commitments of Boeing, Sierra Nevada Corporation, SpaceX
and others to the competition for providing commercial crew transport services. Bigelow
Aerospace will soon add its commercial module to the International Space Station, taking
another step toward providing permanent commercial orbital destinations for space
transportation. Test flights of suborbital vehicles from Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin, and XCOR
Aerospace will soon begin in earnest, leading to multiple suborbital launches per day from sites
like Spaceport America in New Mexico, Midland International Airport in Texas, and other
locations. Other current and proposed sites in Texas, Florida, Colorado, Hawaii, and Alabama
plan to host similar operations. In each case, the state and local governments are making
significant financial investments to advance the development of these sites.
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With this increase in launch and reentry operations, the FAA anticipates a critical need for
efficient processes for managing the National Airspace System (NAS). In 2014, the FAA
Administrator announced his Strategic Initiatives for the FAA, which include a sub-initiative to
deliver benefits through technology and infrastructure to integrate commercial space operations
into the NAS. Through this initiative, the FAA is focusing on three key objectives of managing
the NAS during launch and reentry operations: reduce, respond, and release. The FAA intends
to develop and apply flexible planning tools and advanced analysis techniques to safely reduce
the amount of airspace that must be blocked in advance of a launch or reentry operation. At the
same time, the FAA is focusing on ways to automate safety calculations and data transfer to
allow air traffic control (ATC) to effectively respond to contingencies and maintain safety during
launch and reentry operations. Finally, the FAA will automate data ingest and transfer to allow
ATC to quickly release airspace blocked for a launch or reentry mission to return it to normal use
once it is no longer affected.
For each launch and reentry, the FAA works to safely minimize the effect of the operation on the
capacity and efficiency of the NAS while providing opportunities for the commercial space
operators to accomplish their mission objectivesi. The work is currently manual in nature, time
consuming, and unable to respond to dynamic conditions as it relies on the use of existing
toolsets that were not designed for commercial space purposes. Interfaces to ingest telemetry
and planning data from the launch and reentry operators into these tools do not exist, so a small
team of FAA traffic managers and aerospace engineers, known as the Joint Space Operations
Group (JSpOG), manually transfers data across tools and networks verbally and on paper,
entering the data by hand, and completing multiple checks to minimize the potential for error.
This allows FAA traffic managers to see the position of the vehicle and its progress along its
planned trajectory relative to other traffic, airspace boundaries, and the boundaries of predicted
hazard areas on the FAA’s Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS) Traffic Situational
Display (TSD), as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: FAA Traffic Flow Management System Traffic Situational Display
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But, being so resource intensive, the team struggles to keep pace with the dynamic tempo of
commercial space operations, presenting challenges to their ability to respond to off-nominal
situations and to minimize the amount of time that airspace must be blocked. A capability to
automate these processes is essential to the FAA’s ability to safely minimize the effects of these
operations on NAS capacity and efficiency without impeding commercial space transportation
industry progress.
In 2015, the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), working in close
coordination with the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), initiated the development of a Space Data
Integrator (SDI) in support of the FAA Administrator’s Strategic Initiatives. This system is
designed to provide the FAA with a capability to automate the current manual processes for
accommodating commercial space launch and reentry operations in the NAS. As the SDI
transitions from a prototype capability to an operational system, the FAA intends to use it to
support current and upcoming operational scenarios, including those associated with NASA’s
Commercial Crew Program, fly back boosters, inland reentries from orbit, and other complex
mission designs.
SDI Platform Architecture
The SDI was developed by Millennium Engineering and Integration Corporation (MEI) of
Satellite Beach, FL under contract to the FAA. The SDI builds on the capabilities of MEI’s Joint
Advanced Range Safety System (JARSS) Configurable Realtime Environment (CoRE) system,
currently used by the US Air Force, NASA, and other government customers. The system
architecture is distributed across three FAA facilities: (1) the William J. Hughes Technical
Center (WJHTC), Atlantic City, NJ; (2) the Air Traffic Control System Command Center
(ATCSCC) in the Event Management Center (EMC), Warrenton, VA; and (3) the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation’s Safety Analysis and Training Laboratory (SATlab) in FAA
Headquarters (FAA HQ), Washington, DC, as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Space Data Integrator Platform Architecture

The WJHTC houses a TFMS remote site (TRS) workstation, which includes a TSD monitor, and
the SDI server hardware. The SDI server receives the incoming data from a launch or reentry
vehicle operator through a secure gateway, converts it into the format that the TFMS can accept,
and routes it to a TRS. A TRS is a TFMS workstation with an extended capability to interface
directly with a TFMS hub, known as the TFMS Auxiliary Platform (TAP), which manages the
flight plan and track data on all active flights in the system. Using the TRS, track data can be
inserted into the TAP as though it was coming in from radar or other source.
The SDI server provides several additional functions. In addition to converting incoming vehicle
data to TFMS format and routing it, it also converts the incoming data to a format usable by the
FAA’s Range Risk Analysis Tool (RRAT) for computing aircraft hazards areas (AHAs). The
SDI server routes this data to a machine running the RRAT, as well as additional data for display
on the Enhanced Space Data Display (ESDD).
The ATCSCC houses the majority of the platform architecture, including another TRS
workstation (TRS3) with a TSD monitor, the RRAT laptop, and the ESDD workstation. The
ESDD workstation includes two remote 24” monitors and keyboard, with the corresponding
tower PC. Lastly, the SATlab acts as another TFMS Remote site (TRS2), which includes a TRS
workstation and TSD monitor, along with a second ESDD workstation.
Each interface within the system architecture serves a very unique purpose to provide the most
accurate representation of the mission. The TSD monitors are primarily used in air traffic
management to depict location, density, and movement of aircraft through the airspace.
Information about each aircraft is shown in a data block, which includes aircraft ID, ground
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speed, and altitude. For the purposes of the SDI, the vehicle involved in the mission is depicted
on the TSD as an aircraft, and the AHA developed from the RRAT is depicted as a Flow
Evaluation Area (FEA), as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Reentry Vehicle Icon and Flow Evaluation Area

One of the most crucial tools incorporated into the SDI is the RRAT. The RRAT, developed by
ACTA, Inc. of Torrance, CA, provides fast-running, high-fidelity algorithms for performing risk
analyses on events such as space vehicle launches and reentries, and the visualization tools to
perform spatial analyses to interpret the results of these risk analyses. The FAA uses RRAT to
assess risk to aircraft from a launch or reentry vehicle failure at any point along the vehicle’s
trajectory by using the last known state vector of the vehicle. Using the information it is given,
the RRAT will develop a set of contours showing the risk to aircraft in the location where the
debris field would be in the event of a vehicle breakup. From the contours, a FEA can be
constructed and displayed on the TSD, allowing air traffic controllers to begin vectoring aircraft
away from the area.
The most robust interface of the SDI is the ESDD, which is also the only interface to be
developed specifically for the system. During a mission, several boxes are active on the ESDD,
including an Event List, Status Lights indicating connection with the operator and vehicle,
Generated for RRAT window, real-time global Map of the trajectory, and a trajectory profile (i.e.
Altitude versus Range) plot, shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Enhanced Space Data Display

The Event List shows the time markers for critical events in the mission such as deorbit burn,
booster separation, drogue chute deploy, etc. Predicted time and Actual time are specified by
timers counting down until each event occurs. Times illuminating in a green font indicate the
event occurred on time; those illuminating in a red font indicate the event did not occur at the
predicted time. Two status lights also employ the use of color to indicate whether the SDI is
receiving data from the vehicle and the operator. Green indicates an open line, and red indicates
data is not being received. Just below the status lights is a Generated for RRAT window that
updates each second with vehicle state vector data. A real-time map shows the entire planned
vehicle trajectory in blue for the duration of the mission, while the actual vehicle trajectory is
‘drawn’ overtop in green as the mission progresses. In addition, the instantaneous impact point
(IIP) updates in real time and is visible in red. The map has the ability to zoom, pan, and tilt to
see greater detail on the trajectory, IIP, or launch/landing sites. Below the map is an Altitude
versus Range plot, which uses the same color-coding as the map (planned trajectory – blue;
actual trajectory – green) and also updates in real-time. The map and plot are both simple ways
for the JSpOG operator to visually monitor the vehicle.
The system’s operators will work from the ATCSCC EMC, shown in Figure 5 below, where the
main system interfaces are located. An individual from the JSpOG will be the operator of the
ESDD and TSD at the ATCSCC EMC during a mission. Also located in the EMC will be an
RRAT operator, who will coordinate with the JSpOG operator to run the program when
necessary. Together, the JSpOG operator and RRAT operator will interface directly with the
system and provide the FAA support to a mission.
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Figure 5: FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center Event Management Center

Key features
Three main functions will be achieved by the SDI: (1) automated situational awareness, (2)
monitoring of missions transitioning through the NAS, and (3) detection and response to
abnormal events. By automating situational awareness, delay of information transfer and
potential for human error are reduced. Data provided by the system will be time-accurate,
thereby improving situational awareness of the vehicle during the mission. Similarly, the system
will monitor the vehicle as it transitions through the NAS, which will provide better information
to be used when determining the extent of airspace closures. Continuous monitoring of the
vehicle also allows for quicker and easier detection and response to off-nominal events. Time is
saved by having the system immediately identify an off-nominal event, which could contribute to
an incident or catastrophic event.
Automated situational awareness is achieved by combining real-time vehicle telemetry data and
real-time vehicle health data without human intervention, thus reducing potential for human
error. Vehicle telemetry and health data are provided by the vehicle operator to the system
where the two are combined for display on the ESDD. The TSD also acts as a supplementary
tool to provide situational awareness more comprehensively. As a result of this automation, the
JSpOG operator can focus on monitoring the mission as it progresses.
Since the TFMS manages both flight plans and track data, the SDI provides the JSpOG operator
with the ability to file a flight plan for a launch or reentry vehicle. A flight plan contains
additional information on an active flight that can be displayed as a data block on the TSD to
improve situational awareness, including the aircraft ID, the origin and destination airports of the
flight, and navigation fixes or other waypoints that make up the flight route.
With the ability to better monitor missions as they transition through the NAS, the FAA will
have more information to use when managing traffic flow. The JSpOG operator will have the
ability to use the information already provided by the system, and decide what changes can be
made to the airspace before completion of the mission. Airspace that would normally remain
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restricted for the duration of a launch or reentry could be opened if volumes of airspace in certain
areas were no longer determined to be of risk. Continuous monitoring throughout the duration of
a mission will allow for opportunities for the airspace to be dynamic during operations, better
integration of aircraft and space vehicles, and overall efficiency of the NAS would increase.
Similarly, increased monitoring of the vehicle means quicker and easier detection of off-nominal
events that could occur. Given the FAA’s mandate of public safety, it is beneficial to have
access to information of abnormal events as quickly as possible so that action can be taken if
necessary. With most of the missions that will be monitored by the system, a few seconds could
include significant changes in location of the vehicle, IIP, and resulting hazard areas. The sooner
the FAA has knowledge of a potential vehicle breakup or emergency situation, the sooner action
can be taken to develop a hazard area, alert air traffic, vector aircraft away from the area, and
begin emergency procedures.
Limitations
While the SDI is designed to automate current manual processes, it will not completely automate
them, at least not initially. Based on the FAA’s current approach to monitoring launch and
reentry operations at the Command Center, the program focuses initially on the TFMS. This is
the tool that national traffic managers at the Command Center and air traffic manages at other
ATC facilities, including En Route Centers, use to perform strategic traffic management. In that
sense, they use TFMS to manage traffic flows across facility boundaries and on a more regional
or even national scale. Alternatively, air traffic controllers use other tools, including the En
Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) system and Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System (STARS), to conduct tactical air traffic control at the Center and Terminal
level respectively. These individuals communicate directly with pilots, and provide direction of
individual aircraft at the sector level within a facility.
The SDI will help automate the flow of launch and reentry vehicle trajectory information and
AHA information across the TFMS, but it will not be capable in its current design to help
automate the flow of this information to the ERAM and other systems. This is due to the lack of
an existing dynamic interface between these two systems. Thus, when representations of the
launch or reentry vehicle or an associated AHA are dynamically updated within TFMS using the
SDI, those same representations must be manually transferred to ERAM or STARS as they are
today. In the next phase of SDI development, the FAA intends to complete the flow of data
across these interfaces, potentially using the NextGen System Wide Information Management
(SWIM) capability.
Other limitations of the SDI are the result of using existing systems for the display of launch and
reentry vehicle data that were not designed for this purpose. These limitations have been
discovered through the operation of the SDI that has occurred through its initial demonstrations.
These limitations include issues with data update rates, using flight plans, and maintaining
accurate representations of a vehicle’s position during expected loss of data scenarios.
The TFMS TSD provides time-accurate representations of aircraft position to traffic managers.
This information is updated just once every minute. Due to the distance and altitude that a
launch or reentry vehicle can cover in a minute, a higher update rate may be needed.
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Limitations also exist in the ability to file a flight plan for a launch or reentry mission.
Traditional flight plans require the input of an origin and destination airport. Vehicles reentering
from orbit obviously do not have an origin airport, and those designed to splash down in the
ocean do not have a destination airport either. Vehicles launching to orbit obviously do not have
destination airports. In the current system, when data from a flight begins to enter the system (at
the point where a flight prepares to depart an airport), the system “attaches” the flight plan to the
incoming data, allowing traffic managers and controllers to retrieve additional information on the
flight through its data block – the information displayed next to the aircraft’s icon on a traffic
display. This information includes the aircraft ID, type, its altitude, its ground speed, and its
planned route of flight, including origin and destination. As long as the flight plan remains
attached to the incoming data, the information can be displayed. Since a launch or reentry
vehicle may not have an origin or destination airport, or both, a flight plan cannot be easily
attached to the incoming data. As a result, only the aircraft ID, altitude, and ground speed can be
displayed in its data block. Further, useful tools built into TFMS, such as the ability to display
an aircraft’s planned route of flight as a series of line segments on the TSD map, are not
available for launch and reentry vehicles.
A flight plan can be attached to incoming data from a launch vehicle that does originate its flight
from an airport. This includes the Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo or XCOR Aerospace Lynx
vehicles. Unfortunately though, issues exist in keeping the flight plan attached to the data.
Some launch and reentry vehicles experience expected loss of data -- or loss of signal (LOS) -conditions during a mission. LOS conditions are temporary. They may be caused by
obstructions to antennas or the inability of a signal to penetrate the plasma surrounding a vehicle
in a high speed phase such as atmospheric reentry.
Temporary LOS conditions occur at times for aircraft as well, due to a number of factors
including the transit between areas of radar coverage and antenna obstructions. The TFMS can
account for these by propagating the vehicle’s position along its planned route of flight using
basic characteristics of the aircraft type. The position of the aircraft advances on the display,
although highlighted to indicate the signal is missing. Once the signal returns, the position
begins to update with incoming data. The algorithms that conduct this propagation expect the
incoming data to agree with the propagated position of the aircraft to a specific tolerance based
on the characteristics of the aircraft. If the incoming position does not agree within this
tolerance, the system treats the incoming data as a new flight. This prevents it from mistakenly
attaching a flight plan to the wrong set of incoming data. In these instances, the incoming data
proceeds without a flight plan.
For launch vehicles, this condition always occurs following an expected LOS, as the system’s
algorithms cannot account for the characteristics of the launch vehicle that allow it to travel a
greater distance or climb or descend at a greater rate than aircraft. When the data returns after an
LOS, the system automatically assumes it is coming from another flight. In addition, the
position of the launch vehicle during the LOS is never accurate, as it is propagated using aircraft
characteristics that do not match those of the actual vehicle.
Given these limitations, the ESDD becomes a valuable tool for providing additional insight to
the operator. The ESDD updates at the rate of the incoming data (generally once per second),
and it allows the operator to display the planned route of flight (i.e. the nominal trajectory) and
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data block info such as speed and altitude throughout the flight. It also provides immediate,
direct indications to the operator during planned and unplanned LOS conditions.
Testing strategy
Multiple tests have been conducted on the system through a thorough testing strategy beginning
with platform survivability tests. Testing was first done to confirm that all crucial components
could power on following transit from MEI’s development facility to the destination each will be
kept. Following survivability tests, platform connectivity and functional tests were performed
with MEI’s assistance to ensure that data flows between the ESDD, TFMS, RRAT, and all other
components, and that each function performed as expected. Next, a multitude of validation tests
were conducted to demonstrate a working system. During validation tests, full-length mission
simulation data were used, while simultaneously exercising all data flows. A variety of mission
types were tested including expected LOS, unplanned LOS, reentry from orbit, launch to orbit,
suborbital, booster fly back, etc. Additionally, many of these missions not only varied in activity
type, but also by the nature of the vehicle, including trajectories that modeled the SpaceX
Dragon, Virgin Galactic SpaceShipTwo, XCOR Lynx, Lockheed Martin Orion, and others.
The final step in the validation testing was an end-to-end test using data transmitted from
SpaceX of a simulated Dragon reentry. This test allowed the FAA to successfully demonstrate
the SDI’s ability to receive and process external data from a commercial launch or reentry
vehicle operator. SpaceX played a key role in this test and in the development of the toolii.
Working with SpaceX and FAA network engineers, MEI was able to develop an interface for the
SDI that provides options for commercial launch and reentry operators to establish the
connection protocol for data transmission. The FAA plans to continue to partner with SpaceX
and other commercial space launch and reentry vehicle operators to develop new capabilities for
improving the way the NAS is managed during these operations.
Alongside validation tests, demonstrations of playback and archive capabilities were worked
through. The ESDD has the capability of recording the mission, and storing it in an archive to be
played back at a later time. Testing scenario configurations focused on the function of the SDI
data emulator (SDE) and the RRAT. Issues that were discovered during testing were either
subject to troubleshooting and remediated immediately, or documented in a reporting system for
later treatment. Once technical issues with the system were identified and worked through,
testing shifted to evaluation of the operators that would be using the SDI. JSpOG operators and
RRAT operators were evaluated using scripted role-play exercises in which each operator used
the system to support a simulated mission in their respective role, while communicating as they
would with the vehicle operator and appropriate ATC centers through hotlines and other means.
Usability of the system with the operators was tested, as well as interactions between the
different parties.
Keeping humans involved in the testing as operators highlighted some of the human factors
issues that were not anticipated with the original design of the system. As much as the SDI has
operational requirements to meet, the functionality of the system with the operator is just as
important to ensure that its capabilities are not degraded because the interfaces are not
compatible with the user. Especially in the role-play exercises, the testing involved all parties
interacting together for the first time and some improvements to the system were suggested. As
testing progressed to include more facets of the system (hardware, software, operators, etc.) each
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component’s issues were worked through. With repetition, most issues were resolved, while the
elements/capabilities that performed correctly with each test were confirmed.
Plan for Phased Integration and Verification
To expedite the development process so as to have the SDI capability in place for the number
and type of complex missions that are anticipated, the FAA has designed a series of operational
demonstrations of this capability to take place during actual commercial space operations. The
SDI prototype will be applied to specific missions in parallel with current approaches to
demonstrate the benefits that automation can provide.
During these operations, real-time telemetry data from a launch or reentry vehicle will be routed
to the SDI for ingest into the FAA’s network test environment, allowing display of the vehicle’s
position on the FAA’s TSD relative to actual current air traffic. The data will also be routed to
the RRAT to compute AHAs. By automating these interfaces, the FAA will be able to develop,
implement and test new approaches to dynamically modifying AHAs in realtime to
incrementally reduce the amount of airspace that must be blocked as a launch or reentry
operation transpires. This capability will also allow the FAA to compute an AHA using the most
up-to-date vehicle data in the event of an off-nominal situation.
The demonstrations will focus on increasingly complex missions, beginning with reentries of
capsule type vehicles from orbit and launches of expendable launch vehicles to orbit. Following
successful demonstrations of these types, the FAA will look to apply the SDI to gliding reentry
vehicles, suborbital vertically launched vehicles, suborbital manually piloted vehicles, and
flyback boosters.
The FAA intends to gather statistics after each demonstration to validate and quantify the
reduction in effort required in monitoring an operation and the NAS efficiency gains that could
be realized by implementing dynamic modification of AHAs during the operation. These
metrics will be applied to the mission analysis to support an investment decision leading to the
eventual deployment and broad application of an automation solution.
Results
Though the SDI is currently at a stage preceding demonstration, the results from testing and
development have shown that the system has the capabilities for which it was designed. On a
fundamental level, the multiple hardware components were proven to function effectively. The
software and interfaces are functioning effectively as well, but are still being worked through and
enhanced to provide the best platform for demonstration.
Aligning with the goals of the development, the system has shown the successful use of
automation, which requires fewer personnel. The SDI system requires a total of only two people
to run, one to monitor the operation of the ESDD and the other to monitor and execute the
RRAT. The transition from a mode of making constant inputs to one of just monitoring created
the opportunity for the operator to better engage in the mission. Both the JSpOG operator and
RRAT operator were found to work well with the system, and FEAs were computed (from
insertion of vehicle state vector data in the RRAT to appearing on the TFMS) in less than four
minutes during testing scenarios.
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Through testing, a variety of vehicle and mission types were shown to work with the system,
though they highlighted some differences between how each was displayed on the ESDD in
terms of the appearance of elements such as the trajectory and IIP. Though it was determined
that the TFMS had limitation in the rate in which the information updated, it did fulfill its
intended purpose of visually integrating the vehicle into the system.
All of the components together provided a wider image and means of monitoring commercial
space activities. Minor adjustments are still being made, but the infrastructure has been
developed and is working successfully. Results are positive thus far, and show that the system is
well on its way to aiding in a more efficient management of the NAS by the FAA.
Lessons Learned
Development of the SDI has revealed several lessons learned about the capabilities needed for
the system to become a successful tool for NAS integration. On a systematic level, it was
learned that it is not easy to input space vehicle data into a system designed for aircraft. In most
cases, the system will not properly handle the data because of vast variations in metrics such as
altitude, velocity, direction, and combinations of similar metrics. This may not be deal-breaker
now, as the TFMS mostly aids in situational awareness, but it does indicate a complexity in
attempting to combine systems, which were designed for different purposes.
Many of the lessons learned involve the user of the system, including the JSpOG and RRAT
operators. Distribution of labor was found to be of importance to maintain the best environment
for response to off-nominal scenarios. With only two operators, the monitoring of the ESDD and
TSD by the JSpOG operator exists as one task so that the RRAT operator can do the action of
running RRAT. Both operators can confer when necessary, but clear distribution of labor is
critical for maintaining a sterile environment in the EMC.
Testing especially highlighted the importance of creating a tool that had interfaces that aided in
efficiency and ease of use for the user. It is important for the SDI to be user-oriented, because
the system relies on operators to identify and respond to the information it presents. In this vein,
it was determined that automation can result in the decreased ability of the user to notice when
something off nominal occurs. With the ESDD display, the changing of color of the Status
Lights to indicate a loss of communication is not always effective in acquiring the JSpOG
operator’s attention. This is especially true when he/she is viewing another element of the ESDD
in full screen and does not have a view of the Status Lights. For this reason and similar ones,
more or multi-sensory alerts are needed to attain the operator’s attention when it is lost due to the
need to focus on other tasks or the inability to see the single alert.
Some lessons learned have shown components of the system whose importance was
underestimated. Others emphasize elements that need to be taken into account in further
development. Until the SDI is fully integrated and in use, the FAA will continue to learn lessons
on assets and limitations of the system as development persists.
Conclusion
Given the increasing frequency and complexity of commercial launch and reentry operations, the
FAA must continue to research and develop the technologies and capabilities to realize the
integration of these operations into the NAS. The FAA’s SDI system focuses on ways to
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monitor operations as they transit the NAS and to quickly and effectively respond to off-nominal
scenarios. These capabilities will provide the FAA with the platform to transition its approach to
managing the NAS during launch and reentry from special events to more routine operations.
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